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Abstract: 
 
This commentary explores the relationships between the construct of successful aging and the 
experimental psychology of human aging—cognitive gerontology. What can or should cognitive 
gerontology contribute to understanding, defining, and assessing successful aging? Standards for 
successful aging reflect value judgments that are culturally and historically situated. 
Fundamentally, they address social policy; they are prescriptive. If individuals or groups are 
deemed to be aging successfully, then their characteristics or situations can be emulated. If an 
individual or a group is deemed to be aging unsuccessfully, then intervention should be 
considered. Although science is never culture-free or ahistorical, cognitive gerontology is 
primarily descriptive of age-related change. It is not prescriptive. It is argue that cognitive 
gerontology has little to contribute to setting standards for successful aging. If, however, better 
cognitive function is taken as a marker of more successful aging—something not universally 
accepted—then cognitive gerontology can play an important assessment role. It has a great deal 
to contribute in determining whether an individual or a group evidences better cognitive function 
than another. More importantly, cognitive gerontology can provide tools to evaluate the effects 
of interventions. It can provide targeted measures of perception, attention, memory, executive 
function, and other facets of cognition that are more sensitive to change than most clinical 
measures. From a deep understanding of factors affecting cognitive function, cognitive 
gerontology can also suggest possible interventions. A brief narrative review of interventions 
that have and have not led to improved cognitive function in older adults. Finally, the enormous 
range is addressed in the estimates of the proportion of the population that meets a standard for 
aging successfully, from less than 10% to more than 90%. For research purposes, it would be 
better to replace absolute cutoffs with correlational approaches (e.g., Freund & Baltes, 
1998, Psychology and Aging, 13, 531–543). For policy purposes, cutoffs are necessary, but we 
propose that assessments of successful aging be based not on absolute cutoffs but on population 
proportions. An example of one possible standard is this: Those more than 1 standard deviation 
above the mean are aging successfully; those more than 1 standard deviation below the mean are 
aging unsuccessfully; those in between are aging usually. Adoption of such a standard may 
reduce the wide discrepancies in the incidence of successful aging reported in the literature. 
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Article: 
 
In many ways, the central philosophical and theoretical concern in the field of gerontology is 
successful aging—what is it and are we achieving it? As evidence, the February 2015 issue of 
the journal The Gerontologist was devoted to the theme of successful aging, reflecting the 
importance of this concept to the field of gerontology (Pruchno, 2015). The 15 articles explored 
the contentious but productive debate that developed in reaction to the 1987 article by Rowe and 
Kahn that distinguished successful aging from usual aging. This exploration exposed the various, 
often inconsistent, ways in which successful aging has been conceptualized and measured. As 
Pruchno noted, this entailed questioning whether it should be defined objectively or subjectively, 
examining the role of society and culture versus the individual, and arguing whether successful 
aging is a process or an outcome. Left largely unexplored was the role that the scientific study of 
human aging can or should play. The question addressed here is what the contributions of the 
experimental psychology of human aging are or could be—which we will call cognitive 
gerontology for reasons to be explained—to understanding and assessing successful aging. 
 
Successful aging 
 
As Peterson and Martin (2015) note, Havighurst (1961) focused attention on the concept of 
successful aging in the first edition of the first volume of The Gerontologist, suggesting that it is 
defined by “conditions of individual and social life under which the individual person gets a 
maximum of satisfaction and happiness” (p. 8). Rowe and Kahn (1987) emphasized the 
heterogeneity of the aging population and proposed that, within the range of normal aging, a 
conceptual distinction should be made between those who are aging successfully with minimal 
physiologic loss relative to younger adults and the remaining individuals who are aging usually. 
Describing what they called the MacArthur model of successful aging, Rowe and Kahn (1997) 
later elaborated that successful aging encompasses the avoidance of disease and disability, the 
maintenance of high physical and cognitive function, and sustained engagement in social and 
productive activities. 
 
The hundreds of citations of the articles by Rowe and Kahn testify to the ferment they created. 
The 2015 special issue of The Gerontologist was an attempt to pull together the issues, 
criticisms, and developments of the intervening decades. The themes of the articles in the special 
issue were captured in the systematic review of the field by Martinson and Berridge (2015). 
These included (a) that the criteria for successful aging should be expanded and loosened; (b) 
that the subjective experience of older people be included (something Havighurst, 1961, had 
argued from the start); (c) that it was too focused on the individual, failed to take into account 
political and social constraints on the individual, encouraged ageism, and reflected neoliberal 
values; and (d) that the field was exclusionary and failed to incorporate approaches that 
emphasized aging with dignity and embracing loss (Pruchno, 2015). 
 
The conceptualizations of successful aging of Rowe and Kahn and the reactions to them are 
often characterized as models. They are not models in the usual scientific sense of the term. 
Rather they are external criteria—value judgments—imposed on the phenomena of human aging. 
Successful aging is a historically and culturally situated judgment that reflects the values of a 
particular culture at a particular point in history. We believe much of the apparent confusion 
comes from failing to acknowledge this or, more often, acknowledging it but then failing to 
accept its implications. At the broad, conceptual level, these value judgments provide criteria for 
choosing the phenomena on which we should focus, for example, disease, disability, physical 
function, cognitive function, or social engagement (Rowe & Kahn, 1997). Fundamentally, the 
judgments are policy-oriented and prescriptive. Much of the reaction to Rowe and Kahn has 
concerned whether additional dimensions of aging merit central attention. At the narrow, 
operational level, the value judgments about successful aging drive decisions about what 
measures should be used for each dimension and how a cutoff should be selected that 
dichotomizes individuals into successful and not successful. Effectively, then, successful aging is 
defined as meeting a specified level of performance or status on one or more specified 
dimensions. A recent review found 84 unique and different operational definitions of successful 
aging (Cosco, Prina, Perales, Stephan, & Brayne, 2013). Under those definitions, the percentage 
of the participants who were aging successfully ranged from less than 1 to more than 90. Given 
that the choices of dimensions, measures, and cutoffs are all value judgments reflecting policy 
goals, some range is to be expected. What may be surprising is the extent of the range in 
definitions from essentially the same culture at essentially the same historical time. Some would 
argue that the range underscores the need for more rigorous operationalizations of the construct. 
In our view, equally rigorous operationalizations of the construct could lead to quite different 
classifications if the underlying values differ. 
 
What is the purpose of a construct of successful aging? A definition of—or more correctly, a 
criterion for—successful aging serves a critical role. Presuming that successful aging is 
something to be aspired to and unsuccessful aging, something to be avoided, it provides a 
criterion for deciding whether intervention is called for. Moreover, if we identify a group of 
individuals as aging successfully (or unsuccessfully), we can explore the features they share (for 
example presence of a gene or a common nutritional history). Those shared features can suggest 
interventions and how they might be targeted. If we do intervene, the criterion allows us to judge 
whether the intervention increased successful aging or decreased unsuccessful aging. This is 
what Pruchno (2015) meant when she concluded that “with an enhanced understanding of what 
successful aging is, we will be in a stronger position to develop interventions that enable more 
people to age successfully” (p. 3). A more precise conclusion is that with an enhanced consensus 
about what successful aging is, we will be better able to implement policy to achieve it. 
 
The experimental psychology of human aging: Cognitive gerontology 
 
The central question we wish to address is this: What is or could be or should be the contribution 
of the experimental psychology of human aging to successful aging? The term “cognitive aging” 
is often used to characterize the phenomena under study, and here we use the term cognitive 
gerontology to refer to the scientific study of those phenomena. For cognitive gerontology to 
have a role, the prerequisite is that successful cognitive functioning should be a central 
component of a general definition of successful aging. Better cognitive function might be a 
component per se, or it might be an antecedent of other components of successful aging. An 
example of the latter is seen in Cahn-Weiner, Malloy, Boyle, Marran, and Salloway (2000), who 
adopted a composite of scores on executive function tests as a measure of cognitive function and 
the Instrumental Activities of Daily Living (IADL) as a measure of quality of experience. The 
IADL examines everyday functioning in four areas, including Safety, Medication 
Administration, Meal Planning and Preparation, and Money Management. They found that 
executive function accounted for 19% of the variance in IADL over and above that accounted for 
by medical risk factors, depression, age, and education. We note that Depp and Jeste (2006) 
found that 13 of 29 operational definitions of successful aging included cognitive function. 
Conversely, this makes it clear that many proposed standards for successful aging do not include 
better cognitive function. Arguing that cognitive function should be included in a definition of 
successful aging in no way diminishes the importance of other components such as disability and 
physical function. 
 
The experimental psychology of human aging is a very young field. In the very first volume of 
the Journal of Gerontology, arguing for a science of gerontology, Hinman (1946) said, 
 
The pathologic conditions, or the diseases of old age, are covered by geriatrics, a branch 
of medicine. But the aging process of healthy people is a much more important problem, 
demanding study of the social aspects, industrial adjustments, and educational needs of 
normal older people. There has been practically no scientific research in gerontology. 
Now the time has come for an intensive study of the biologic processes of aging and the 
interrelation of these processes with changing social conditions. (p. 416) 
 
What is missing here is any mention of psychology. And, indeed, the first volume of the Journal 
of Gerontology (1946) did not contain a single article concerning the psychology of aging (out of 
36 total). But by 1986, a separate section of the journal had been created for Psychological 
Sciences (along with Medical Sciences, Biological Sciences, and Social Sciences) and 67% of 
the 49 articles in that section concerned experimental psychology. 
 
This expansion occurred at much the same time as the field of cognitive psychology emerged as 
the dominant school of experimental psychology. The publication of Ulric Neisser’s enormously 
influential book, Cognitive Psychology (1967), is often given as the birth date of the field. The 
term “cognitive” was not intended to be limiting—the field comprises perception, attention, 
memory, and higher functions—but rather to make a sharp distinction from the earlier 
behaviorist focus that viewed much of cognition as epiphenomenal. Since then, the choice of 
topics in the experimental psychology of human aging has been strongly influenced by the 
zeitgeist of mainstream cognitive psychology. So research in cognitive gerontology has been 
primarily concerned with characterizing loss with age—or occasionally stability or even 
growth—in terms of phenomena borrowed from cognitive psychology. 
 
What does cognitive gerontology have to say about successful aging? 
 
What does or could cognitive gerontology say about successful aging? To foreshadow our 
conclusion, the answer is relatively little. We will argue that cognitive gerontology has important 
contributions to make, but they are not in providing a definition of successful aging. 
 
When cognitive gerontologists are asked about successful aging, five themes recur. The first is 
that longitudinal studies show that the extent of cognitive decline is overestimated and the age of 
onset of decline underestimated by cross-sectional studies (e.g., Lindenberger, 2014; 
Schaie, 2013). The second is that some abilities are spared. For example, verbal abilities such as 
vocabulary are preserved (e.g., Schaie, 2013), as is expertise gained earlier (e.g., Charness & 
Krampe, 2008). The third is that in some instances, there is compensation for age-related 
changes, for example, use of two brain hemispheres by older adults for tasks localized to one 
hemisphere in younger adults (e.g., Reuter-Lorenz & Stanczak, 2000). The fourth is that there 
are preserving characteristics such as a reliance on memory to provide effective strategies in 
some older adults whereas others avoid relying on memory (Touron, 2015). The fifth is cognitive 
reserve, the idea that “individual differences in the cognitive processes or neural networks 
underlying task performance allow some people to cope better than others” with loss 
(Stern, 2009, p. 2016). We do note that there is dissent on each of these assertions. The first two 
themes say that functioning is higher, and therefore loss is less, than is widely believed. This is 
important to the public understanding of aging, but it has little to say about successful aging. The 
last three themes say that some individuals show higher functioning, and therefore less loss, than 
the typical peer. This assumes that relatively higher function reflects relatively more successful 
aging. This is important for assessing the effectiveness of intervention but is not particularly 
helpful in defining successful aging. 
 
To oversimplify the matter, successful aging is a pure value judgment—it is prescriptive—
whereas cognitive gerontology is a relatively value-free body of knowledge and set of 
procedures for acquiring that knowledge—it is descriptive. Science is never value free, as 
Kuhn’s The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) made clear. Nevertheless, the principal 
value judgments in cognitive gerontology have come from the zeitgeist of mainstream cognitive 
psychology and mostly have to do with the way cognitive function is parsed or fractionated. In 
the 1960s and 1970s, concepts such as fluid versus crystallized intelligence (e.g., Horn & 
Cattell, 1967) sprang from the contemporary focus on intelligence testing. In the 1980s and 
1990s, concepts such as age-related declines in fundamental operations such as speed of 
processing (e.g., Salthouse, 1996), working memory (e.g., Salthouse, 1994), and inhibitory 
function (e.g., Hasher & Zacks, 1988) derived from the focus in mainstream cognitive 
psychology on humans as information processors. Now, notions such as impaired dopaminergic 
function (Bäckman, Nyberg, Lindenberger, Li, & Farde, 2006) and the scaffold theory of aging 
and cognition (STAC; Reuter-Lorenz & Park, 2014) reflect the recent neuroscience revolution in 
cognitive psychology. Value judgments about research directions provide little or no guidance 
for value judgments about successful aging. 
 
Intervention research in cognitive gerontology 
 
The often implicit assertion that any meaningful improvement in cognitive function means more 
successful aging is minimal, but it has led to the most important contribution of cognitive 
gerontology: intervention research. Interventions that might lead to improved cognitive function 
have been extensively explored by cognitive gerontologists. In practice, the goal has primarily 
been to bring about improvement with a program of training that is relatively short, relatively 
focused, and relatively low in the cost of resources. The interventions fall into four categories. 
Some interventions simply ask, “Can the performance of older adults at this task be improved?” 
Or, in other words, can older adults learn? Others explore the possibility of transfer, either near 
transfer to other tasks in the same domain (such as training on one speeded task benefitting 
other, different speeded tasks) or far transfer to tasks in different domains (such as training in 
speed benefitting performance on memory tasks). Finally, there are interventions that explore 
benefits to cognitive function from training such as physical exercise that does not involve 
cognitive tasks. This might be called very far transfer. Although we will not provide an 
extensive review, we will give examples in each of these categories. 
 
Older adults can learn; they improve with practice on even demanding tasks. For example, older 
adults showed a significant improvement in the ability to multitask—to carry out two separate 
tasks simultaneously or nearly simultaneously—after thousands of trials of practice (Bherer et 
al., 2005; Maquestiaux, Hartley, & Bertsch, 2004), although they did not achieve the levels of 
performance of younger adults. Charness and Campbell (1988) showed that six sessions of 
training led to significant improvement in older adults in the time to square numbers between 1 
and 99, narrowing the age differences. There is also good evidence for near transfer, that is, 
transfer from training in one task in a domain, such as memory, to other tasks in the same 
domain. For example, in a systematic review and meta-analysis of 35 studies of training in 
memory strategies in older adults, Gross et al. (2012) found the overall improvement in memory 
performance across studies was significant (0.43 standard deviation). In a randomized, controlled 
study of 2832 older adults, Ball et al. (2002) found that training in speed of processing, memory, 
or reasoning led to significant improvements in the targeted ability. 
 
Far transfer—transfer from training in one domain such as memory to another domain such as 
reasoning—has been much more difficult to demonstrate. For example, Ball et al. found no 
evidence for improvements other than in the domain trained. From a meta-analysis not specific 
to older adults Au et al. (2015) concluded that training on working memory tasks generally 
improved measured fluid intelligence, yet Borella et al. (2014) found little or no evidence in 
young-old or old-old adults that working memory training had an effect beyond working 
memory measures. Perhaps surprisingly, there is good evidence for very far transfer, 
improvement in cognitive function as a result of noncognitive training. For example Park et al. 
(2014) trained older adults in quilting or in digital photography or both and found significant 
improvement in episodic memory (although not in processing speed, mental control, or 
visuospatial processing). The most striking finding is that even relatively short interventions 
involving aerobic exercise lead to significant general improvements in cognition. In a meta-
analysis of 29 studies with exercise interventions 1 month or longer, Smith et al. (2010) found 
significant improvements in attention and processing speed, episodic memory, and executive 
function (but not working memory). 
 
We have limited ourselves here to improvements with training in cognitive function, making the 
tacit assumption that cognitive improvement, per se, represents more successful aging. We have 
not addressed whether improvements in cognitive function transfer in turn to improvements in 
everyday functioning and perceived well-being, dimensions that are often central to conceptions 
of successful aging (but see, e.g., Cahn-Weiner et al., 2000; Willis et al., 2006; Wolinsky et 
al., 2006). We also want to mention that Simons et al. (2016) have provided detailed and well-
justified guidelines for how intervention research should be carried out. 
 
It is clear from these examples that cognitive gerontology can play two roles: (a) it can suggest 
and form the basis for some interventions and (b) it can provide the measures to determine 
whether interventions were successful. In the case of learning and of near and far transfer, it 
provided both the basis and assessment, successful with learning and near transfer, unsuccessful 
with far transfer. In the case of very far transfer, it provided the assessment tools but not the 
intervention. The success of exercise interventions at improving cognitive function in a number 
of domains raises the important question of the appropriate level at which to intervene. Even 
though the goal is to improve cognitive function, interventions that target underlying 
substrates—such as physiology or pharmacology—may be more broadly effective than 
interventions at an explicitly cognitive level. 
 
A clear contribution that cognitive gerontology can make is to provide targeted measures for 
assessments of change. Of the 13 definitions of successful cognitive aging mentioned earlier 
(Depp & Jeste, 2006), 8 used a criterion involving a clinical assessment tool such as the Mini-
Mental Status Examination (MMSE; Folstein, Folstein, & McHugh, 1975) or the Short Portable 
Mental Status Questionnaire (SPMSQ; Pfeiffer, 1975). Three others used self-assessment of 
memory; only one used cognitive measures: in that case, of executive function. 
 
A reasonable question, then, is why tasks drawn from cognitive gerontology would be preferable 
to tools such as the MMSE or SPMSQ. One answer is that the cognitive tasks are targeted. 
Cognitive function is multifaceted—speed, attention, visuospatial functioning, working memory, 
episodic memory, semantic memory, prospective memory, reasoning, and executive functions—
and tests can be chosen to tap particular dimensions of functioning. Best practices from 
confirmatory factor analysis are now frequently adopted. These call for the use of three or more 
measures of a dimension and extracting a latent factor to reduce the effects of measure-specific 
variance. In the intervention studies reviewed, improvement was found in some dimensions but 
not others. The clinical tools provide an assessment of the general level of functioning but do not 
isolate particular abilities. A second answer is that cognitive tasks can be sensitive to relatively 
small differences or changes in normal individuals whereas clinical tools are designed to detect 
exceptional functioning and most individuals score at ceiling. Substantial change could occur as 
a result of an intervention, yet it would be below the resolution of the clinical tools. 
 
A possibility for choice of measures is a hierarchy, based on the goals. One goal for assessing 
cognitive function might simply be answering the question: Is the individual showing signs of 
dementia (with no goal of making more than broad distinctions)? Here the clinical measures 
would be perfectly appropriate. A second goal might be to assess general cognitive function but 
to make finer distinctions. From the norms by Crum, Anthony, Bassett, and Folstein (1993) for 
the MMSE, for adults aged 60–70, the 25th percentile is a score of about 25, the 50th, 27, and the 
75th, 29. That does not allow fine distinctions, and modest gains as a result of interventions 
could be swamped by noise. A third goal would be to distinguish among different cognitive 
functions in level of observed function. For both the second and third goals, a battery of more 
specific tests is called for. 
 
We see assessment of interventions as the central role of cognitive gerontology in addressing 
successful aging. There are many issues surrounding intervention that are important, but we are 
not able to address here. We mention two. In the same way that conceptions of successful aging 
are culturally and historically situated, so are conceptions of intervention. The way we have 
discussed intervention reflects a Western, positivist, secular set of values that focuses more on 
the worth and experience of the individual than it does on societal-level concerns. Consider a 
society that adopts a fatalistic philosophy (“It is God’s will.”) or a society that practices ritual 
senicide such as ubasute, in which elderly individuals were allegedly taken to a remote place and 
left to die in ancient Japan. It would appear that these customs are inconsistent with intervention. 
In the first society, however, it would not be uncommon to pray for the individual (either for 
relief or forbearance). That is, in fact, an intervention, although of a very different sort than we 
envision. Similarly, senicide is an intervention, although hardly one that benefits the individual. 
A second important point that we do not address here is who makes the decision that intervention 
is warranted. Is it the individual, who may fail to see change where it has occurred or who may 
see change where none has occurred objectively? Is it the observer, whose perceptions may also 
be fallible? 
 
Operational standards from cognitive gerontology for successful cognitive aging 
 
Any attempt to set an absolute standard or cutoff beyond which an individual is judged to be 
aging successfully (rather than relatively more or less successfully) is arbitrary and reflects 
sociocultural values rather than the science. For research purposes, correlational approaches are 
preferable to arbitrary cutoffs (e.g., Freund & Baltes, 1998). For purposes of social policy, 
cutoffs seem to be unavoidable. There may be a way around this dilemma. Consider standards 
for who is successfully aging in the domain of cognitive functioning. Depp and Jeste (2006) 
found standards ranging from “no cognitive impairment” using the MMSE (where impairment 
was otherwise undefined; Andrews, Clark, & Luszcz, 2002), to MMSE scores of 18 or higher 
(Von Faber et al., 2001), to MMSE scores at or above the 80th percentile from a sample of 5875 
older adults (Newman, Arnold, & Naydeck et al., 2003). In our view, the last of these provides 
an opening to how we might set appropriate standards for successful cognitive aging and avoid 
unacceptably large differences in the numbers judged to be successful from one study to another. 
We do so by setting the standard at a particular proportion. In the case of Newman et al. (2003), 
it was a proportion of a very large sample, but using population norms such as those provided by 
Crum et al. (1993) would be even better. The choice of a particular proportion is still an arbitrary 
value judgment, but it is an open and public choice and makes clear that successful aging is 
always relative. One example of an accessible and useful standard would be this: More than 1 
standard deviation above average (i.e., 16%) is labeled “successful”; beyond 1 standard deviation 
below (again, 16%) is “unsuccessful”; and between plus and minus 1 standard deviation (68%) is 
“usual.” With such a standard, any complaint that the proportion of older adults labeled 
successful is too large or too small would be moot. This standard may seem inadequate for 
certain political or policy considerations, but it would allow a consensus on how successful and 
unsuccessful aging should be operationally defined for the purposes of exploring sequelae that 
may lead to productive interventions. 
 
This approach would require population norms for the measures used. Many cognitive tests have 
been normed for clinical use in the domains of executive functioning (e.g., Wisconsin Card 
Sorting Test, Verbal Fluency), attention (e.g., Continuous Performance Test, Symbol Digit 
Modalities Test), memory (e.g., California Verbal Learning Test, Rey Auditory Verbal Learning 
Test), and visuomotor skills (e.g., Embedded Figures Test, Trail Making Test). One problem is 
that the clinical measures derive from experimental measures with some lag, so they may be less 
reflective of current thinking in mainstream cognitive psychology. One example is the California 
Verbal Learning Test (Delis, Kramer, Kaplan, & Ober, 1987), which reflects conceptualizations 
and procedures that were common in the 1970s and 1980s but that are less current now. The lag 
is also a consequence of the fact that standardizing and norming is so demanding that there is 
real inertia to develop new measures. A second problem is that there may be secular shifts in 
population norms (e.g., Ben-David, Erel, Goy, & Schneider, 2015). Neither trends in cognitive 
psychology nor population values will shift abruptly, so neither of these is likely to be a constant 
concern, but it does make sense to periodically reevaluate the measures and norms. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Cognitive gerontology has played and will continue to play a vital role in describing the aging 
process. In our view, it can and should play only a secondary role in framing a sociocultural 
definition for successful aging. When standards for successful aging are articulated and those 
standards involve cognitive function, cognitive gerontology can assess the extent to which those 
standards are met. Most importantly, when interventions to achieve more successful aging are 
pursued, cognitive gerontology can provide tools to assess the effectiveness of those 
interventions. 
 
Postscript 
 
This essay was the result of an international conference in which European and United States 
researchers were invited to present current work related to successful aging. The research 
presented was important and timely, but the presentations in fact devoted limited attention to 
successful aging. In discussion, we specifically explored the relation of the experimental 
psychology of cognitive aging to the construct of successful aging. The outcome was less than 
satisfying, resulting only in the five themes mentioned above. Subsequently, we came to the 
realization that the outcome was the result of a fundamental disconnect between the 
sociopolitical value judgments of successful aging and the realities of scientific research on 
aging as it is actually practiced. This essay is a preliminary attempt to recognize and to bridge 
that disconnect. 
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